Mr. Black. You ask good questions. You wonít like the answers.
First, let me clarify. I didnít say that software wasnít involved but that the software was doing exactly what it was designed to do. The problem that led to the accidents was a system design problem. For example, the data from both AOA sensors was on the data bus, but the avionics wasnít reading the data from both sensors because it hadnít been instructed to do so. Thatís an easy software fix.
The proximate cause behind both accidents was the MCAS (and not the pilot) commanding nose down in response to a perceived (by the MCAS) stall condition. I think that we arenít being told the whole story here. According to Boeing, MCAS was created to deal with handling characteristics when the aircraft has partial flap deployment, light weight and CG at the aft limit. Why did they give the MCAS the authority to fly the aircraft? It still has it, by the way, theyíre just making it easier to turn it off. How does an aircraft, fully loaded with fuel, passengers, and cargo meet the criteria for MCAS because both accidents happened just after takeoff?
The software fixes are fixing how various systems on the aircraft are working together. How do you know everything is A-OK? You donít. Thatís theoretically why we have the FAA. The Navy has NAS China Lake, Calif. They fly all new software before itís released to the fleet.